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Bias in predictions of task duration has been attributed to misremembering previous
task duration and using previous task duration as a basis for predictions. This research
sought to further examine how previous task information affects prediction bias by
manipulating task similarity and assessing the role of previous task duration feedback.
Task similarity was examined through participants performing two tasks 1 week apart
that were the same or different. Duration feedback was provided to all participants
(Experiment 1), its recall was manipulated (Experiment 2), and its provision was
manipulated (Experiment 3). In all experiments, task similarity influenced bias on the
second task, with predictions being less biased when the first task was the same task.
However, duration feedback did not influence bias. The findings highlight the pivotal
role of knowledge about previous tasks in task duration prediction and are discussed in
relation to the theoretical accounts of task duration prediction bias.
Keywords: task duration prediction bias, planning fallacy, task similarity, previous task duration feedback, self-
learning account
INTRODUCTION
Predicting task duration has been the focus of much research, which has almost universally found
that predictions are biased (e.g., Buehler et al., 1997; König et al., 2015). Prediction bias is evident
on tasks as diverse as writing a college thesis (Buehler et al., 1994), shopping for gifts (Kruger and
Evans, 2004), and solving abstract problems (Thomas et al., 2003). There is considerable support for
the planning fallacy, which is the tendency to underestimate future task duration despite knowing
that previous similar tasks did not finish on time (Buehler et al., 2010b).
The planning fallacy was identified by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) who suggest that two
kinds of data are available when predicting task duration: singular and distributional information.
Distributional information is essentially base-rate data (e.g., previous task performance), whereas
singular information concerns aspects of a focal task (e.g., number of parts). Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) claim that the planning fallacy occurs because singular information becomes the
focus of attention whilst distributional information is ignored. This explanation has been termed
the inside–outside account (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993), as using singular or distributional
information is like taking an ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ view of a focal task, respectively.
Inherent in the inside–outside account is the notion that people possess distributional
information (e.g., they remember their performance on previous similar tasks) but typically ignore
it when predicting task duration. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that when making a
prediction on a task that has been encountered before people place less emphasis on what task
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information they remember and more emphasis on what
they perceive differentiates the current task from previous
similar tasks. Accordingly, through the use of verbal protocols
(Ericsson and Simon, 1980), Buehler et al. (1994) found that
predictions are typically based on aspects of focal tasks, but
when people are prompted to consider their previous task
performance just before making a time prediction, the temporal
underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy is reduced.
Buehler et al.’s (1994) research suggests that people tend to take
an ‘inside’ perspective when making task duration predictions,
but when they incorporate what information they remember
about previous tasks into their predictions, they do a better job
of judging when tasks will finish. Although the inside–outside
account makes no prediction about the role memory for previous
task performance in the task duration prediction process, the
work of Buehler et al. (1994) highlights the benefit of taking such
an outside perspective when making time predictions. The role
of memory for previous task performance is central to another
account of the planning fallacy which claims that people use
distributional information but inaccurately recall it when making
time predictions (Roy et al., 2005). This memory-bias account
states that people consider previous task information but their
memory for such information is biased, which leads to biased
predictions. Roy and Christenfeld (2007) suggest that because
people rarely closely monitor the durations of the tasks they
perform in daily life, the planning fallacy (and the overestimation
of future task duration) is a result of memory being for estimated
or perceived duration rather than actual duration. Support
for this claim comes from the retrospective time estimation
literature, where autobiographical events (Burt, 1992) and public
events (Burt and Kemp, 1991) are remembered as being shorter
than was actually the case. There is growing support for the
memory-bias account because the amount of prior experience of
a focal task seems to matter when it comes to underestimating
task duration (Roy and Christenfeld, 2007). Moreover, prediction
bias is reduced when feedback about previous task duration is
provided, thus correcting memory (Roy et al., 2008). Similar to
research supporting the inside–outside account (Buehler et al.,
1994), Roy et al.’s (2008) findings suggest that using previous
task information can reduce prediction bias, suggesting some
complementarity between the memory-bias and inside–outside
accounts. However, Roy et al. (2008) found that such information
had to be accurate to be beneficial whereas this was not examined
by Buehler et al. (1994), suggesting an arguably subtle difference
between the two accounts. A more obvious way in which the
accounts differ though is in the link between the use of previous
task information and prediction bias, with the inside–outside
account predicting that bias is due to not using information and
the memory-bias account predicting that bias occurs because
such information is incorrectly used.
Similar to the memory-bias account, the anchoring account
(Thomas et al., 2007), emphasizes the use of information
about previous tasks. The account derives from the anchoring
and adjustment heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and
posits that the actual or perceived duration of previous tasks
serves as a basis (anchor) for predictions which are typically
insufficiently adjusted according to the demands of focal tasks.
This anchoring and insufficient adjustment process results in
underestimation when previous tasks are shorter than focal tasks
and overestimation when previous tasks are longer than focal
tasks. This difference in the direction of bias was found by
Thomas et al. (2007) who varied the relative durations of previous
and focal tasks. Further support for the anchoring account comes
from studies where participants are shown numbers (anchors)
representing the durations of previous tasks before predicting the
durations of focal tasks. For example, König (2005) found that
presenting an anchor concerning a shorter or longer duration
on the same task as a focal task resulted in underestimation
or overestimation, respectively. Similarly, Thomas and Handley
(2008) found that the direction of bias differed in the same way
when anchor values concerned a task that was the same as or
different to a focal task. Moreover, bias was reduced among
participants that reported taking account of their performance on
previous similar tasks when making a prediction on the focal task,
suggesting that prior task experience might reduce the impact
of task duration anchors on prediction bias. However, prior task
experience was not manipulated by Thomas and Handley (2008),
meaning that the effect of the similarity between anchor value
(previous) tasks and focal tasks is unclear.
Anchoring is also posited as a factor in time prediction bias
when information about previous task duration is not explicitly
presented (e.g., in the form of anchor values). König et al.
(2015) suggest that implicitly knowing that one misestimated
the duration of a previous task is sufficient to reduce prediction
bias on the next task through self-generated feedback on task
duration. König et al. (2015) identified this self-learning effect
by using two unrelated tasks of similar duration (coloring-in a
drawing and building a toy bird) and having some participants
estimate the duration of the first task retrospectively. They found
that both tasks were underestimated but that the retrospective
estimate reduced prediction bias on the second task relative to
when no retrospective estimate was made and relative to the first
task. König et al. (2015) suggest that making the retrospective
estimate led participants to focus attention on how long they
thought they took on the first task and they used this information
as a self-generated anchor value that was adjusted according
to the perceived demands of the second task. Consistent with
this claim, self-generated anchor values have been shown to
influence the extent of adjustment in judgments on tasks without
a temporal element (e.g., general knowledge tests; Epley and
Gilovich, 2005), suggesting that an explicit anchor value is not
necessary to induce an anchoring and adjustment judgment
strategy (Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995). From their findings,
König et al. (2015) proposed the self-learning account of task
duration prediction bias.
The self-learning (König et al., 2015), anchoring (e.g., Thomas
et al., 2007), memory-bias accounts (e.g., Roy and Christenfeld,
2007), and inside–outside accounts (Kahneman and Lovallo,
1993) all imply that information about previous tasks can
influence bias in predictions of task duration. However, unlike
the inside–outside account (see e.g., Buehler et al., 1994), the
other three accounts suggest that using such information does
not necessarily reduce bias. The shared focus on the use of
information about previous tasks not necessarily reducing bias
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 760
fpsyg-09-00760 May 22, 2018 Time: 17:35 # 3
Thomas and König Task Duration Prediction Bias
implies that the memory-bias, self-learning, and anchoring
accounts are complementary.
Although some factors concerning information about
previous tasks have been found to influence prediction bias
(e.g., temporal distance between actual and predicted duration;
Roy and Christenfeld, 2007), a potentially important factor,
task similarity, has yet to be studied. The similarity of previous
and focal tasks is important and germane to the self-learning,
anchoring, and memory-bias accounts because it concerns the
relevance of previous task information. Moreover, manipulating
task similarity allows the testing of predictions derived from
these three accounts plus the inside–outside account. Thus,
examining task similarity enhances our understanding of the
mechanisms underlying task duration prediction bias and
provides an important contribution to the extant literature.
Although task similarity should not influence bias according
to the inside–outside account (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993)
because information about previous tasks is typically ignored,
incorporating remembered information about previous similar
tasks into predictions would presumably reduce bias because of
the relevance of that information. Thus, a prediction based on
the inside–outside account would be that bias is less when tasks
are similar, provided that people consider their previous task
performance when making predictions (Buehler et al., 1994).
Predicting the effect of task similarity is clearer for the
memory-bias account (Roy et al., 2005) because previous task
performance is remembered, albeit incorrectly, when making
predictions. This process implies that previous similar tasks
are relevant to focal tasks and thus informative for predicting
task duration, whereas memory for previous different tasks
is irrelevant and so of little or no benefit. Furthermore, if
people know how long they took on a previous similar task
(through receiving feedback), bias should be reduced due to such
information correcting memory (Roy et al., 2008). Thus, the
memory-bias account would predict that bias is less when tasks
are similar but only when the exact task duration of previous tasks
is known.
The effect of task similarity can be predicted from the
anchoring account because of centrality of the use of previous
task duration in the time prediction process to the account. Using
previous task duration as an anchor for predictions can occur
when previous and focal tasks are different and might or might
not reduce bias depending on the relative durations of the tasks
(e.g., Thomas et al., 2007). However, such anchoring should only
reduce bias when previous and focal tasks are similar because of
the relevance of the anchor information (Thomas and Handley,
2008). Thus, the anchoring account would predict that bias is less
when previous and focal tasks are similar.
Similarly, because of the centrality of the use of previous
task information in the self-learning account, the effect of task
similarity can be predicted clearly. Although previous different
tasks can influence predictions through learning that such tasks
were misestimated and using this knowledge to adapt predictions
on a focal task (König et al., 2015), when tasks are similar, this
knowledge will be pertinent to the focal task and so reduce bias.
Thus, the self-learning account would predict that task similarity
reduces bias.
In conjunction with task similarity, examining the role of
knowing the exact duration of a previous task through receiving
feedback permits further evaluation of the memory-bias,
anchoring, and self-learning accounts, all of which emphasize
the role of previous tasks in influencing prediction bias. For
the memory-bias account, being told how long a previous task
took should correct memory, resulting in less prediction bias
previous and focal tasks are similar (Roy et al., 2008). For the
anchoring account, basing predictions on the feedback exact
duration of a previous similar task should reduce bias because of
the relevance of that task information to the focal task (Thomas
and Handley, 2008). For the self-learning account, thinking about
one’s performance on previous task where the exact duration is
known should be useful only when the tasks are similar, thus
reducing bias due to transferring the insight gained from the
previous task to the focal task (König et al., 2015).
The present research comprised three experiments in which
student participants performed two tasks in two sessions
separated by a temporal interval (1 week) that is reflective of
what happens in applied settings (e.g., workplaces). In such
settings, there are rarely occasions when tasks are totally novel
(i.e., when nothing remotely similar has been done before), with
people typically undertaking fairly familiar tasks (Boltz et al.,
1998; Hinds, 1999). To try to mimic this state of affairs, the focal
task chosen here was one that involved the kind of skills that
students would often utilize in the course of their studies (e.g.,
proofreading and editing assignments). In all experiments, the
first and second tasks were the same (formatting an essay twice)
or different (building a miniature castle first then formatting an
essay second). Prediction bias on the second more familiar task
was the measure of the effect of task similarity and previous task
duration feedback. Feedback on the exact duration of the first
task was provided at the end of the first session in Experiments
1 and 2. In Experiment 2, prompting the recall of that feedback at
the start of the second session was manipulated. In Experiment
3, providing feedback on the duration of the first task was
manipulated.
All experiments tested the hypothesis that bias on the more
familiar second task would be less when the two tasks were
identical. Experiment 2 also tested the hypothesis that prompting
the recall of the feedback duration of the first task would correct
memory, resulting in less biased predictions on the second task
when the two tasks identical. Similarly, Experiment 3 tested
the hypothesis that having feedback on the exact duration of
the first task would correct memory, thereby reducing bias
on the second task when the two tasks were identical. Given
the shared focus on the use of previous task information not
necessarily reducing prediction bias among the memory-bias,
self-learning, and anchoring accounts, additional analyses sought
to test predictions from these accounts in all experiments.
EXPERIMENT 1
Participants performed either the same essay-formatting task at
the first and second sessions or built a miniature castle at the first
session and formatted the essay at the second session. Participants
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were told the exact duration of the task they performed at the first
session just after they had finished that task.
Method
Participants
Forty psychology students (28 female and 12 male) at a large
university in Southern England participated voluntarily in return
for course credit. Participants were aged 18 to 33 (M = 20.90,
SD = 3.46) years.
Design
A one-factor [Task Similarity (same vs. different)] between-
groups design was used.
Materials
A computer-based essay formatting task was chosen as the focal
task and the identical previous task because it is typical of the
kind of academic task routinely performed by university students
and has been used in similar research (Francis-Smythe and
Robertson, 1999). The task was a 7-page, 2200-word essay, which
was a template from a module on a History degree course. Its
text was black, Times New Roman, 12-point font, and had 1.5
line-spacing. Each page was A4-sized with 1-inch margins all
around. Formatting the unformatted essay involved making 200
changes ranging from correcting spelling and grammatical errors
to changing the typeface (e.g., italicizing text).
A Playmobil R© plastic toy was chosen as the different previous
task because it has been used in task duration prediction research
(Thomas et al., 2007). The task involved constructing a model
multi-turreted castle comprising 68 components by following a
set of pictorial sequential instructions presented in a booklet.
Procedure
Participants were recruited to an experiment on task performance
and were not informed of the time estimation element of it until
the end of the second session. At the first session, participants
were randomly assigned to one of the two equal-sized first
task conditions: essay and castle. At each session, participants
were tested individually in a laboratory with no clock, and were
instructed to remove their watches and place them out of sight so
that they would not be a distraction during task performance.
At the first session, before predicting task duration,
participants in the castle condition were informed that they
could refer to the instruction booklet whilst building the castle.
They were then given 2 min to view the instruction booklet and
task components that were arranged on a table in front of them.
At the first session, the essay condition was presented with a
paper copy of the formatted and unformatted versions of the
essay task and given 2 min to inspect them before predicting task
duration. Afterwards, the paper copy of the unformatted task was
removed from sight and a laptop computer with the unformatted
task displayed on its screen (as a Microsoft R© Word Version 2000
document) was placed on a table in front of these participants.
Performing the task involved making the necessary changes to
the on-screen unformatted task so that it looked exactly like the
paper version of the formatted task that was located beside the
computer and had to be followed.
Before performing each task, participants predicted task
duration (in whole or part minutes) in writing. Participants
were asked to make as accurate and realistic a prediction as
possible and were allowed as much time as they needed to do
this. The sheets on which predictions were made were removed
from sight whilst the task was performed so that predictions
could not be amended. To facilitate thorough task performance,
after predicting duration, participants were informed that the
task would be inspected for accuracy after completion. Task
duration was recorded using a digital stopwatch and participants
were informed of their completion times just after the task had
finished.
This procedure was repeated for the second session, except
that all participants performed the essay task from the first session
and no feedback was given about its duration. At the second
session, participants that performed the castle task at the first
session were in the castle-first condition and participants that
performed the essay task at the first session were in the essay-
first condition. At the end of the second session, participants were
fully debriefed about the study. Each session lasted between 40
and 50 min.
Results and Discussion
The data from Experiment 1 is available in Supplementary Data
Sheet S1. At the first session, all the castle condition built the
castle correctly and the essay condition made an average of
181.75 (SD = 8.87) changes to the essay. At the second session,
the number of changes to the essay did not differ between the
essay-first (M = 189.00, SD = 4.63) and castle-first conditions
(M = 186.80, SD = 4.95), t(38) = 1.45, p = 0.155, d = 0.46,
suggesting that any difference in prediction bias found at the
second session is not due to the number of changes made to the
essay.
Basic descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1, which
shows that there was underestimation on the essay and
overestimation on the castle at the first session. The tasks differed
in duration, with the castle taking just over half as long as
the essay, t(38) = 5.38, p < 0.001, d = 1.70. At the second
session, Table 1 shows that there was overestimation in the essay-
first condition and underestimation in the castle-first condition.
Table 1 shows that the duration of the second essay task differed
between the conditions, with the castle-first condition taking
20 to 25% longer than the essay-first condition, t(38) = −2.99,
p = 0.005, d = 0.94.
As actual task durations were not similar between the
conditions in both sessions, proportional error scores were
computed to assess prediction bias. These scores measure
prediction bias as a function of task duration and are calculated
by subtracting predicted from actual task duration and dividing
the difference by actual task duration. Proportional error scores
are well-established as an appropriate dependent measure in the
time estimation literature (Brown, 1997).
On the first task, prediction bias was less on the castle,
t(38) = −5.96, p < 0.001, d = 1.87. One-sample t-tests with
values of zero (no bias) revealed significant underestimation
on the essay, t(19) = −7.04, p < 0.001, and non-significant
overestimation on the castle, t(19) = 1.89, p = 0.075. As the essay
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TABLE 1 | Mean (standard deviation) predicted and actual duration and prediction
bias (minutes), and proportional error scores per task and task similarity condition
in Experiment 1.
Task Task similarity condition
Essay-first Castle-first
(n = 20) (n = 20)
First Predicted duration 15.62 (9.43) 20.45 (7.63)
Actual duration 33.75 (9.86) 18.84 (7.50)
Prediction bias −18.13 (13.08) 1.61 (7.59)
Error score −0.50 (0.32) 0.16 (0.38)
Second (Essay) Predicted duration 33.40 (19.91) 19.70 (11.05)
Actual duration 30.11 (7.85) 38.14 (9.13)
Prediction bias 3.29 (15.94) −18.44 (14.33)
Error score 0.08 (0.40) −0.46 (0.31)
task involves the kind of skills that students are likely to use when
preparing college assignments (e.g., proofreading), significant
underestimation on the task could be due to participants recalling
how they performed on previous similar tasks and using this
knowledge as a basis for their prediction. If such knowledge
was inaccurately recalled, then significant underestimation would
be expected according to the memory-bias account (see Roy
and Christenfeld, 2007). Similarly, a lack of knowledge of the
seemingly less familiar castle task should result in less biased
predictions because of the lack of task-specific memories to
inaccurately recall. On tasks where prior task experience is
low or absent, predictions would presumably be based on
information concerning the task at hand such as the number
of distinct, discrete elements the task entails (Thomas et al.,
2003). On the second task, prediction bias was less in the
essay-first condition, t(38) = 4.97, p < 0.001, d = 1.51,
with significant underestimation in the castle-first condition,
t(19) = −6.50, p < 0.001, and non-significant overestimation
in the essay-first condition, t(19) = 0.88, p = 0.389. The
effect of task similarity was further examined by comparing
predictions on the second task. Predictions were longer in
essay-first condition than the castle-first condition, t(38) = 2.69,
p = 0.011, d = 0.85, suggesting that the effect was driven
by the difference in predictions and actual durations (see
above).
To assess whether predictions were based on previous task
duration (Roy et al., 2005), the relationship between predictions
on the second task and the actual, feedback duration of the
first task was analyzed. Predictions were more highly correlated
with actual durations in the essay-first condition, r(20) = 0.71,
p < 0.001, than the castle-first condition, r(20) = 0.20, p = 0.405,
and this difference was significant, Fisher z = 1.99, p = 0.046.
These findings suggest that knowing the exact duration of a
previous task is informative for predictions only when this
knowledge is relevant to the focal task. In conjunction with the
effect of task similarity, these findings indicate that feedback
on previous task duration does not debias predictions when it
pertains to a different task (Roy et al., 2008).
To assess whether predictions were anchored on previous task
duration, the difference between predictions on the second task
and actual durations on the first task was analyzed per condition.
The reason for this analysis is that anchoring involves using the
feedback duration of the first task as a basis for predicting the
duration of the second task. Thus, predictions should be close to
actual durations if an anchoring strategy is used (Thomas et al.,
2007). Predictions were found to be similar to actual durations
in the essay-first condition, t(38) = 0.11, p = 0.915, d = 0.03,
and the castle-first condition, t(38) = −0.32, p = 0.754, d = 0.07,
suggesting that anchoring occurred. Using an anchoring strategy
should result in slight overestimation in the essay-first condition
because those participants tended to complete the second task
faster than the first task. Conversely, in the castle-first condition,
such anchoring should result in underestimation on the essay as
the essay was longer than the castle. In conjunction with the task
similarity effect, these findings provide support for the anchoring
account but indicate that anchoring only reduces misestimation
when a previous task is the same as a focal task (Thomas and
Handley, 2008).
To assess whether learning from prediction bias on the
first task and using this self-generated feedback as a basis
for predictions on the second task (König et al., 2015) was
influenced by task similarity, error scores on the first and second
tasks were compared between the task similarity conditions.
A 2 (task) × 2 (task similarity) mixed ANOVA produced an
interaction, F(1,38) = 7.24, MSE = 0.12, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.62, with
error scores being higher on the first task than the second task in
the essay-first condition (p < 0.001) and lower on the first task
than the second task in the castle-first condition (p < 0.001). In
conjunction with the task similarity effect, this finding indicates
that participants learnt from their mistakes on the first task when
it was the essay and used this self-generated informative feedback
to make a less biased prediction when faced with the same task
again. Thus, there is support for the self-learning account (König
et al., 2015) and the idea that the transfer of insight gained on a
previous task is only useful when that task is the same as a focal
task.
This experiment highlights the effect of information about
previous tasks on task duration prediction bias and provides
support for the memory-bias, anchoring, and self-learning
accounts. However, the effect of previous task information was
examined indirectly through telling all participants how long
they took on the first task. Thus, it was not possible to directly
assess whether such feedback was used when predicting task
duration. To provide a stronger test of the effect of previous task
information, the explicit recall of the feedback duration of the first
task was manipulated alongside task similarity in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
Participants performed two tasks (formatting an essay twice or
building a miniature castle then formatting the same essay)
1 week apart. At the end of the first session, the exact duration
of the first task was feedback to all participants. At the second
session, half of those participants that built the castle and half of
those that formatted the essay at the first session were prompted
to recall the feedback duration of the first task.
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Following Experiment 1, it was hypothesized that: (1)
prompting the recall of the duration of the first task would reduce
prediction bias on the second task when the two tasks were
identical; (2) predictions on the second task would be less biased
when the two tasks were identical.
Method
Participants
Eighty psychology students (23 male and 57 female) at a large
university in Southern England participated voluntarily in return
for course credit. Participants were aged 18 to 36 (M = 23.16,
SD = 4.51) years.
Design
A 2 (Task Similarity [same vs. different]) × 2 (Previous Task
Duration Memory Prompt [yes vs. no]) between-groups design
was used.
Materials
The essay task was from Experiment 1. The castle task was a
Lego plastic toy that involved constructing a miniature castle
tower comprising 164 components. This task comprised more
components and so was considered to be more complex.
Moreover, pilot-testing (N = 8) revealed that the castle task took
32.60 min on average to complete (SD = 4.68), meaning that it
was of similar duration to the essay task from Experiment 1 and
of longer duration than the castle task from Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as Experiment 1, except for the
following two changes. One, at the start of the first session,
participants were randomly assigned to one of four equal-sized
conditions that were formed by crossing the previous task
duration memory prompt and task similarity factors. Two, at the
start of the second session before predicting task duration, the
memory prompt conditions were asked to recall the duration of
the first task, of which they had been informed at the end of
the first session. Half of these participants recalled task duration
within 10 min of actual task duration and 20% recalled task
duration exactly.
Results and Discussion
The data from Experiment 2 is available in Supplementary Data
Sheet S2. At the first session, the essay condition made 159.95
corrections to the task on average (SD = 24.39) and all of the castle
condition completed the task correctly. At the second session, the
number of changes made to the essay task did not differ between
the essay-first (M = 163.55, SD = 19.70) and castle-first conditions
(M = 164.35, SD = 22.63), t(78) =−0.17, p = 0.867, d = 0.04.
Basic descriptive statistics for the first and second tasks are
presented in Tables 2, 3, respectively. Table 2 shows that there
was underestimation on the castle and the essay at the first
session. The tasks differed in duration, with the essay taking
longer than the castle, t(78) = 5.52, p < 0.001, d = 1.24. Table 3
shows that there was overestimation in the essay-first conditions
and underestimation in the castle-first conditions on the second
task. The castle-first conditions took longer to complete the
TABLE 2 | Mean (standard deviation) predicted and actual duration and prediction
bias (minutes), and proportional error scores per the first task in Experiment 2.
Task
Essay (n = 40) Castle (n = 40)
Predicted duration 27.63 (13.21) 25.95 (12.43)
Actual duration 42.43 (10.50) 29.80 (9.93)
Prediction bias −14.80 (17.23) −3.85 (14.96)
Error score −0.29 (0.43) −0.05 (0.53)
essay (M = 39.30, SD = 11.37) than the essay-first conditions
(M = 34.55, SD = 8.54), t(78) = 2.11, p = 0.038, d = 0.47. Due
to the difference in duration of the tasks at sessions 1 and 2, error
scores were used to assess prediction bias.
On the first task, bias was less on the castle, t(78) = −2.21,
p = 0.03, d = 0.50, with significant underestimation on the essay,
t(39) =−4.30, p< 0.001, and non-significant underestimation on
the castle, t(39) =−0.66, p = 0.516.
On the second task, a 2 (duration memory prompt) × 2
(task similarity) ANOVA produced no interaction, F(1,76) = 0.01,
MSE = 0.01, p = 0.98, η2p = 0.01, and no effect of duration
memory prompt, F(1,76) = 0.22, MSE = 0.03, p = 0.641,
η2p = 0.01. There was an effect of task similarity, F(1,76) = 7.65,
MSE = 0.90, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.09, with prediction bias being
less in the essay-first conditions (M = 0.08, SD = 0.33) than
the castle-first conditions (M = −0.14, SD = 0.34). There
was non-significant overestimation in the essay-first conditions,
t(39) = 1.42, p = 0.164, and significant underestimation in the
castle-first conditions, t(39) = −2.53, p = 0.016. Predictions on
the second task were longer in essay-first condition (M = 34.80,
SD = 10.05) than the castle-first condition (M = 31.23, SD = 7.66),
and the difference approached significance, t(78) = 1.79, p = 0.08,
d = 0.40. This finding suggests that the effect of task similarity was
due mainly to the difference between the conditions in the actual
duration of the second task (see above).
To examine the accuracy of memory for feedback previous
task duration, the relationship between actual and recalled
durations on the first task was assessed using Pearson
correlations. Actual and recalled durations were highly correlated
on both tasks overall, r(20) = 0.97, p < 0.001. High correlations
were observed on the essay, r(20) = 0.95, p< 0.001, and the castle
separately, r(20) = 0.98, p < 0.001, and the difference between
these coefficients was not significant, Fisher z = 1.36, p = 0.174.
These findings suggest that the feedback duration was accurately
remembered.
To assess whether predictions were based on previous task
duration, the relationship between predictions on the second
task and the actual and recalled durations of the first task
was examined using Pearson correlations. Predictions were
quite weakly correlated with actual durations in the essay-
first, r(20) = 0.20, p = 0.221, and castle-first memory prompt
conditions, r(20) = 0.03, p = 0.834, and the coefficients did not
differ significantly, Fisher z = 0.05, p = 0.617. Predictions and
recalled durations were quite weakly correlated in the essay-
first, r(20) = −0.11, p = 0.651, and castle-first memory prompt
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TABLE 3 | Mean (standard deviation) predicted and actual duration and prediction bias (minutes), and proportional error scores per task similarity by memory prompt
condition on the second task in Experiment 2.
Condition
Essay-first No prompt Essay-first Prompt Castle-first No prompt Castle-first Prompt
(n = 20) (n = 20) (n = 20) (n = 20)
Predicted duration 36.05 (9.77) 35.80 (10.58) 30.05 (7.75) 32.40 (7.59)
Actual duration 35.60 (9.33) 34.00 (7.13) 37.75 (9.22) 40.85 (13.25)
Prediction bias 0.45 (6.98) 1.80 (11.04) −7.70 (10.95) −8.45 (15.89)
Error score 0.06 (0.30) 0.09 (0.38) −0.15 (0.30) −0.12 (0.39)
conditions, r(20) = −0.02, p = 0.946, and the coefficients did
not differ significantly, Fisher z = −0.26, p = 0.795. These
findings suggest that the accurately remembered task duration
is not informative for predictions regardless of task similarity.
In conjunction with the task similarity effect for prediction bias,
these findings indicate that previous task duration feedback does
not always serve to correct memory and debias predictions (Roy
et al., 2008).
To assess whether anchoring predictions on previous task
duration is influenced by task similarity, predictions on the
second task were compared with the actual duration of the first
task. Predicted and actual duration was similar in the castle-
first memory-prompt (M = 29.15, SD = 8.27, and M = 32.40,
SD = 7.59, respectively), t(19) = −1.43, p = 0.17, d = 0.39, and
no memory-prompt conditions (M = 30.45, SD = 11.45, and
M = 30.05, SD = 7.75, respectively), t(19) = 0.13, p = 0.90,
d = 0.03. Predictions were shorter than actual durations in the
essay-first no memory-prompt condition (M = 36.05, SD = 9.77,
and M = 43.50, SD = 10.50, respectively), t(19) = 3.57,
p = 0.002, d = 0.71, and the essay-first memory-prompt condition
(M = 35.80, SD = 10.57, and M = 41.35, SD = 10.66, respectively),
but the difference was not significant in the memory-prompt
condition, t(19) = 1.54, p = 0.14, d = 0.52.
These findings suggest that predictions were anchored on
previous task duration in both castle-first conditions, whereas
anchoring was less clear in the essay-first conditions. Predictions
being shorter than actual durations in the essay-first conditions
could be a consequence of anchoring but in conjunction with the
sufficient adjustment of predictions from the anchor according to
the known demands of an identical second task. As the second
essay tended to be completed faster than the first essay in the
essay-first conditions, adjusting predictions away from an anchor
of the duration of the same task would be expected to reduce
prediction bias when the task was next performed.
Further likely support for the adjustment of predictions from
the anchor of previous task duration comes from analysis of
the difference between predictions on the second task and
recalled durations on the first task in each memory-prompt
condition. In the essay-first condition, predictions were shorter
than recalled durations (M = 35.80, SD = 10.58, and M = 40.25,
SD = 11.18, respectively), but not significantly so, t(19) = 1.23,
p = 0.234, d = 0.28. In the castle-first condition, predictions
were longer than recalled durations (M = 32.40, SD = 7.59, and
M = 29.50, SD = 8.64, respectively), but not significantly so,
t(19) =−1.12, p = 0.277, d =−0.26. These findings are indicative
of some adjustment of predictions away from the anchor of
quite accurately remembered previous task duration, but that this
strategy was only useful for reducing bias when the identical essay
task was performed for a second time.
To check whether the self-generated learning effect (König
et al., 2015) occurred, error scores on the first and second
tasks were compared between the task similarity conditions.
A 2 (task) × 2 (task similarity) mixed ANOVA produced an
interaction, F(1,78) = 14.16, MSE = 0.14, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.15,
with error scores being significantly higher on the first task than
the second task in the essay-first condition (p < 0.001) but not
significantly lower on the first task than the second task in the
castle-first condition (p = 0.38). In conjunction with the task
similarity effect, this finding suggests that participants that did
the essay first learnt from their mistakes on that task and used
this self-generated informative feedback to make a less biased
prediction on the second task.
Consistent with Experiment 1, prediction bias was less on
the second task when it was the same task as the first task. As
duration feedback was provided, it seems that knowing how long
the previous task took to complete reduces bias on the next
task only when previous and focal tasks are identical. Moreover,
the task similarity effect for bias occurred regardless of whether
the recall of the feedback previous task duration was prompted
just before making a prediction on the second task. As the
two memory-prompt conditions recalled the duration of the
first task quite accurately, the ineffectiveness of the memory
prompt manipulation is rather surprising. Accurately recalling
the feedback duration of the first essay task shortly before
predicting the duration of the same task should have resulted
in the least biased predictions. However, as duration feedback
has been shown to reduce prediction bias when similar tasks
are performed 1 week apart without any memory recall prompt
(Roy et al., 2008), such a prompt might not be necessary because
people’s memory for such feedback tends to be quite accurate.
It could be that knowing the duration of the first task was
sufficient to correct memory and reduce bias on the second task
in the essay-first conditions, thus rendering the memory-prompt
manipulation ineffective. Similarly, the feedback duration of the
same previous task could have served to heighten learning from
mistakes on that task (König et al., 2015) and this information was
used to good effect when predicting the duration of the second
task.
This experiment suggests that knowing the exact duration of
a previous task does not necessarily correct memory and reduce
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prediction bias on the next task (Roy et al., 2008) regardless
of the similarity of previous and focal tasks. Rather, it seems
that task similarity reduces bias through learning from how the
previous task was performed when making a prediction on the
same task again (König et al., 2015). The task similarity effect
might be due to the use of an anchoring strategy (Thomas and
Handley, 2008) wherein predictions are sufficiently adjusted from
the anchor of previous task duration according to the demands
of the focal task only when the tasks are the same, meaning that
the feedback duration is informative and relevant. However, as
all participants were told how long the first task took them, the
usefulness of duration feedback with respect to task similarity
is speculative at best. Simply performing the essay task for a
second time could have been sufficient to reduce prediction
bias, thus negating any effect of duration feedback. It could
be that participants in the essay-first conditions realized that
they had misestimated on the first task and used this relevant
information to make a less biased prediction on the second
task.
To more fully address the role of previous task information,
task duration feedback was manipulated in Experiment 3
alongside task similarity which was examined in the same way as
in Experiments 1 and 2. Task duration feedback was manipulated
by using control conditions in which an essay task was performed
twice but feedback was not provided. If previous task duration
feedback serves to reduce bias, predictions on the second task
should be less biased in the feedback conditions, whereas if
task similarity reduces bias, predictions should be less biased
when the essay is performed twice regardless of whether duration
feedback is provided. Additionally, the role of previous task
information was further investigated in Experiment 3 by more
directly assessing participants’ perceptions of the first task by
having them report what information they used as a basis
for their prediction on the second task, thus elucidating their
reasoning processes. If duration feedback is beneficial when
tasks are similar, then having this information could be reported
as a major reason for predictions on the second essay task.
Conversely, if task similarity is sufficient to reduce bias, then
aspects of the first task could be reported as a major reason for
predictions on the second essay task. The use of verbal protocols
(Ericsson and Simon, 1980) to gauge the reasons participants
gave for predictions on the second task is also beneficial in
providing an insight into the kind of information people use
when making time predictions on tasks that have or have
not been performed recently (i.e., when prior task experience
differs).
EXPERIMENT 3
As in Experiments 1 and 2, all participants performed the same
essay task at the second session and performed the same essay
task or the castle task at the first session 1 week earlier. The
duration of the first task was feedback to half of the castle-first
and essay-first conditions at the end of the first session. Just
after predicting the duration of the second task, all participants
reported what they had based that prediction upon.
Method
Participants
Eighty psychology students (24 male and 56 female) at a large
university in Southern England participated voluntarily in return
for course credit. Participants were aged 18 to 35 (M = 20.63,
SD = 2.85) years.
Design
A 2 (Task Similarity [same vs. different]) × 2 (Previous Task
Duration Feedback [yes vs. no]) between-groups design was used.
Materials
The castle task was from Experiment 2. The essay task was a
shortened version of the essay task from Experiments 1 and 2.
It was shortened to make it similar to the average duration of the
castle task from Experiment 2 (29.80 min). Pilot-testing (N = 10)
revealed that an essay comprising 1302 words and involving
making 140 changes could be formatted in 30 min on average and
this task was used.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 2 except for the
following three changes. One, at the start of the first session,
participants were randomly assigned to one of four equal-sized
conditions that were formed by crossing the task similarity
and previous task duration feedback factors. Two, just after the
first task had been completed, half of the essay-first and castle-
first conditions were told exactly how much time they took to
complete the first task. Three, just after predicting the duration
of the second task, participants reported in writing what factors
they had based their prediction upon.
Results and Discussion
The data from Experiment 3 is available in Supplementary Data
Sheet S3. At the first session, the essay condition made 124.40
corrections to the task on average (SD = 24.39) and all of the castle
condition completed the task correctly. At the second session,
the number of changes made to the essay did not differ between
the essay-first (M = 126.60, SD = 5.24) and castle-first conditions
(M = 128.68, SD = 6.39), t(78) = 1.59, p = 0.116, d = 0.33.
Basic descriptive statistics for the first and second tasks are
presented in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. Table 4 shows that there
was underestimation on the castle and essay at the first session.
The castle and essay tasks did not differ in duration, t(78) = 1.12,
p = 0.267, d = 0.24. However, to be consistent with Experiments
TABLE 4 | Mean (standard deviation) predicted and actual duration and prediction
bias (minutes), and signed proportional error scores per the first task in
Experiment 3.
Task
Essay (n = 40) Castle (n = 40)
Predicted duration 19.50 (7.83) 20.65 (9.71)
Actual duration 28.55 (8.39) 26.33 (9.39)
Prediction bias −9.05 (7.68) −5.68 (12.42)
Error score −0.30 (0.25) −0.16 (0.45)
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TABLE 5 | Mean (standard deviation) predicted and actual duration and prediction bias (minutes), and proportional error scores per task similarity by first task duration
feedback condition on the second task in Experiment 3.
Condition
Essay-first No Feedback Essay-first Feedback Castle-first No Feedback Castle-first Feedback
(n = 20) (n = 20) (n = 20) (n = 20)
Predicted duration 25.00 (9.18) 22.15 (6.74) 23.10 (5.95) 25.45 (10.78)
Actual duration 24.10 (6.12) 21.25 (6.33) 32.15 (6.52) 30.60(9.51)
Prediction bias 0.60 (6.72) 0.90 (3.58) −9.05 (6.13) −5.15 (7.12)
Error score 0.02 (0.28) 0.06 (0.17) −0.27 (0.17) −0.16 (0.21)
1 and 2, proportional error scores were used to assess prediction
bias on the first task. Table 5 shows that there was overestimation
in the essay-first conditions and underestimation in the castle-
first conditions on the second task. At the second session,
the castle-first conditions took longer to complete the essay
(M = 31.38, SD = 8.09) than the essay-first conditions (M = 22.68,
SD = 6.31), t(78) = −5.36, p < 0.001, d = 0.98. As the tasks
differed in duration, proportional error scores were used to assess
prediction bias on the second task.
On the first task, a between-groups t-test revealed that
prediction bias was less on the castle, t(78) = −1.70, p = 0.047,
d = 0.39 (one-tailed). This finding suggests that the student
participants were less good at predicting the duration of the
more familiar essay-formatting task. One-sample t-tests with a
test value of zero (no bias) revealed that the underestimation
indicative of the planning fallacy (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
was evident on the castle, t(39) =−2.22, p = 0.032, and the essay,
t(39) =−7.60, p< 0.001.
A 2 (duration feedback) × 2 (task similarity) ANOVA on the
second task produced no interaction, F(1,76) = 0.70, MSE = 0.11,
p = 0.406, η2p = 0.01, and no effect of duration feedback,
F(1,76) = 2.52, MSE = 0.03, p = 0.116, η2p = 0.03. There
was an effect of task similarity, F(1,76) = 28.90, MSE = 1.29,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.28, with predictions being less biased in the
essay-first conditions (M = 0.04, SD = 0.23) than the castle-first
conditions (M = −22, SD = 0.20). There was non-significant
overestimation in the essay-first conditions, t(39) = 1.03,
p = 0.311, and significant underestimation in the castle-first
conditions, t(39) = −7.02, p < 0.001. Predictions on the second
task were similar in the essay-first (M = 23.58, SD = 8.08) and
castle-first conditions (M = 24.28, SD = 8.68), t(78) = −0.37,
p = 0.710, d = 0.08, suggesting that the effect of task similarity
was mainly due to the difference between the conditions in the
actual duration of the second task (see above).
To ascertain whether predictions were based on previous task
duration, predictions on the second task and actual durations
on the first task were correlated per condition. Consistent with
the memory-bias account, as duration feedback can correct
memory (Roy et al., 2008), correlations should be greater
in the feedback conditions than the no feedback conditions,
and this effect might or might not be influenced by task
similarity. Pearson correlations produced the following results.
The correlation was strong in the essay-first feedback condition,
r(20) = 0.87, p < 0.001, and moderately strong in the essay-first
no feedback condition, r(20) = 0.68, p = 0.001, and the difference
between these coefficients was not significant, Fisher z = 1.47,
p = 0.143. The correlation was weak in the castle-first no feedback
condition, r(20) = 0.04, p = 0.875, and moderately weak in the
castle-first feedback condition, r(20) = 0.24, p = 0.302, and the
difference between these coefficients was not significant, Fisher
z = 0.60, p = 0.548 The correlation was strong in both essay
conditions combined, r(20) = 0.75, p < 0.001 and weak in both
castle conditions combined, r(20) = 0.16, p = 0.331, and the
difference between the coefficients was significant, Fisher z = 2.37,
p = 0.018. These findings suggest that memory for previous task
duration is only informative for predictions on the next task
when that task is the same task. In conjunction with the effect of
task similarity, it seems that receiving feedback on previous task
duration fails to serve to correct memory and debias predictions
when it pertains to a different task (see Roy et al., 2008).
To check whether an anchoring prediction strategy was used,
predictions on the second task were compared with actual
durations on the first task per condition. Predicted and actual
durations were similar in the castle-first feedback, t(19) = 0.52,
p = 0.611, d = 0.17, and no feedback conditions, t(19) = 1.04,
p = 0.312, d = 0.27, whereas predictions were shorter than actual
durations in the essay-first feedback, t(19) = 3.72, p = 0.001,
d = 0.43, and no feedback conditions, t(19) = 3.97, p = 0.001,
d = 0.65. Consistent with the use of an anchoring strategy, these
findings suggest that predictions were sufficiently adjusted for the
demands of the second task only when a previous first task is
informative for a focal task (Thomas and Handley, 2008).
Further support for the use of an anchoring strategy comes
from the reasons that participants gave for their predictions on
the second task. Three categories of reasons were identified by
two independent raters: personal ability (e.g., using computers);
the first task (e.g., duration); the second task (e.g., familiarity).
The first task was cited as the reason for predictions on the second
task by most participants in the castle-first, χ2(1, N = 40) = 19.60,
p < 0.001, and essay-first conditions, χ2(2, N = 40) = 13.40,
p = 0.001 (60 and 85%, respectively), with personal ability being
cited by 15% of the essay-first conditions only. The number
of participants that cited the first task did not differ between
the castle-first and essay-first conditions, χ2(1, N = 58) = 1.72,
p = 0.189. These findings suggest that predictions on the second
task were based on elements of the first task. In conjunction with
the task similarity effect, these findings indicate that people tend
to based their predictions on what tasks they have done before
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 May 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 760
fpsyg-09-00760 May 22, 2018 Time: 17:35 # 10
Thomas and König Task Duration Prediction Bias
and this strategy is only useful for reducing prediction bias when
focal tasks are the same as previous tasks.
To check whether the self-generated learning effect (König
et al., 2015) held when previous and focal tasks are identical,
error scores on the first and second tasks were compared
between the essay-first and castle-first conditions. A 2 (task) × 2
(task similarity) mixed ANOVA produced an interaction,
F(1,78) = 19.97, MSE = 0.08, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.20, with error
scores being significantly higher on the first task than the second
task in the essay-first condition (p < 0.001) but not significantly
lower on the first task than the second task in the castle-first
condition (p = 0.41). In conjunction with the task similarity effect,
this finding suggests that participants learnt from their mistakes
on the first task when it was the essay and used this self-generated
informative feedback to make less biased predictions when faced
with the same task again.
As in Experiments 1 and 2, predictions on the second task were
less biased when the task was identical to the first task. This task
similarity effect held regardless of whether or not participants
were told the exact duration of the first task. The lack of an effect
of duration feedback suggests that having such information does
not always correct memory and debias predictions (Roy et al.,
2008). It would seem that performing the same task a few days
previously was sufficient to produce more realistic predictions,
perhaps through learning from mistakes made on the first task
and using this useful information to good effect. It is feasible that
participants that received duration feedback recognized that their
first prediction was incorrect and sought to rectify this error when
making a second prediction. Using this kind of self-generated
learning strategy (König et al., 2015) should result in less biased
predictions on the same second task because of the relevance of
the information about the previous task.
Consistent with the self-generated learning effect, most
participants referred to the first task as the basis for their
prediction on the second task regardless of the similarity of the
two tasks. This finding suggests that previous tasks are considered
when predicting task duration. Contrary to the inside–outside
account (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993), this finding implies that
distributional information (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) is used
yet does not necessarily reduce prediction bias. Consistent with
the anchoring (Thomas and Handley, 2008), memory-bias (Roy
et al., 2005), and self-learning accounts (König et al., 2015), the
finding suggests that information about previous tasks is used
when misestimating upcoming task duration. Moreover, being
told how long the same previous task took does not result in
better predictions compared with not having this information,
suggesting that the benefit of receiving duration feedback (Roy
et al., 2008) is not universal.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
By examining task similarity and previous task duration
feedback, this research provides a robust test of the effect of
knowledge about previous tasks on bias in predictions of task
duration. Moreover, studying task similarity permits a test of
the four theoretical accounts of task duration prediction bias:
inside–outside, memory-bias, anchoring, and self-learning. In
all experiments, task similarity influenced bias as predictions
were closer to the actual durations of the second task when
it was the same essay as the first task. Also, task similarity
seemed to prevail over being told the exact duration of the
previous task beforehand when the recall of this feedback was
manipulated (Experiment 2) and the provision of this feedback
was manipulated (Experiment 3), as such duration feedback did
not influence prediction bias.
In contrast to the work of Roy et al. (2008), the lack of any
effect of previous task duration feedback suggests that having
such information did not correct participants’ memory for the
first task and debias their predictions on the second task. Rather,
the task similarity effect is consistent with the notion that
participants implicitly learnt from their mistakes on the first essay
task and used this pertinent information to good effect when they
made a prediction on the same task for a second time. Conversely,
implicitly learning from mistakes made on the castle task would
not be beneficial for reducing prediction bias because of the
irrelevance of the self-generated feedback to the essay task (König
et al., 2015). In all experiments, the difference in bias between
the first and second tasks was greater when both tasks were the
essay rather than the castle and the essay. Given the task similarity
effect, this finding is consistent with the self-learning account but
indicates that learning from one’s mistakes on a previous task
does not serve to reduce prediction bias on the next task when
that task is different from the previous task. Thus, this research
highlights the role of task similarity in the self-learning account
(König et al., 2015). Moreover, the present support for the self-
learning account suggests that it has emerged as an important
contributor to our understanding of the task duration prediction
process with good explanatory power, thus constituting a valuable
addition to the literature.
The task similarity effect for prediction bias also seems
consistent with the anchoring account (e.g., Thomas and
Handley, 2008), with predictions on the second task being
based on the (feedback or perceived) duration of the first essay
task but adjusted according to the demands of the second
task. Such adjustment should be sufficient for the demands of
the upcoming identical task because of the relevance of the
information gleaned from performing the previous task, resulting
in less bias. Conversely, adjusting predictions on the essay from
the demands of the very different castle task is not informative of
what performing the essay entails and so would not be expected
to reduce bias.
There was not universal evidence for participants using such
a strategy though, as predictions on the second task and actual
durations on the first task differed only in both essay-first
conditions in Experiment 2 and in the essay-first no memory-
prompt condition in Experiment 3. The lack of a difference
between these measures in Experiment 1, and in the essay-first
memory-prompt condition in Experiment 2 and both castle-
first conditions in Experiments 2 and 3 could be indicative of
anchoring without adjustment. Consistent with this suggestion,
Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) found evidence of anchoring
without adjustment on estimation tasks without a temporal
element (e.g., estimating the distance between local cities) due
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to a process of comparing an anchor value with a target task
value rather than providing an estimate of the target task value
based on that same anchor value. Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995)
created a two-stage judgment process to separate anchoring
from adjustment, with the first stage being devoid of adjustment
due to no estimation of the target task value being made, only
a judgment comparing the target task value with the anchor
value. It was found that comparison judgments were biased in
the direction of the anchor value, with this process occurring
before participants were required to make an estimate regarding
the value of the target task. Thus, anchoring was evident when
adjustment was not possible.
In the context of the present research, Jacowitz and
Kahneman’s (1995) finding could have manifested itself in
participants comparing the demands of the second task with the
actual feedback duration of the first task (Experiments 1 and 2)
and the perceived or actual feedback duration of the first task
(Experiment 3) and using this information as an anchor for
predictions on the second task. This strategy would be expected
to yield greater prediction bias (significant underestimation)
on the essay when the castle was performed first because the
castle-first conditions took longer to do the essay than the essay-
first conditions (in all experiments) due to a lack of prior task
experience.
Although such an anchoring-only strategy could account for
the effect of task similarity, the lack of a difference between
the actual duration of the previous task and the predicted
duration of the focal task when the tasks are identical and
the exact duration of the previous task is known (Experiments
1 and 2) and remembered quite accurately (Experiment 2) is
difficult to explain. As previous task durations and focal task
predictions were similar in Experiment 1, it could be that using an
anchoring-only strategy was effective in the essay-first conditions
because those participants used the knowledge they gained from
performing the first task along with the precise information they
received about how long the task took to make a better prediction
on the second task because on their task-specific experience.
In the essay-first memory-prompt condition in Experiment 2,
predictions on the second task were over 5 min shorter than
actual durations on the first task on average (although not a
reliable difference), suggesting that some downward adjustment
might have occurred. In the essay-first no memory-prompt
condition in Experiment 2, predictions on the second task were
reliably shorter than actual durations on the first task, suggesting
that some downward adjustment did occur.
The present findings are broadly consistent with the
anchoring account (e.g., Thomas and Handley, 2008). However,
incorporating separate manipulations of anchoring alone and
anchoring and adjustment in future research would provide
a more robust examination of the role of anchoring in task
duration prediction bias as well as extending the work of
Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) to judgment tasks with a strong
temporal element. Future research could examine anchoring in
isolation by measuring the difference between anchor values
of normative previous task durations presented to participants
and participants’ own estimates of whether the same task
would take them longer or shorter than the anchor values.
In conjunction with the task similarity effect for prediction
bias, such manipulations would further elucidate the cognitive
mechanisms involved in predicting task duration.
Further support for the anchoring account derives from
the difference in the direction of misestimation on the second
task between the essay-first and castle-first conditions in all
experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, anchoring predictions
on the feedback duration of the first task would yield
underestimation when the shorter castle was performed first
and slight (non-significant) overestimation when the same essay
that took longer was performed first. Similarly, in Experiment 3,
anchoring predictions on the perceived or feedback duration of
the first task (no feedback and feedback conditions, respectively)
would result in underestimation in the castle-first conditions
because these participants tended to take longer to do the essay
than participants in the essay-first conditions who also tended
to do the second task quicker than the first task [t(39) = 6.18,
p < 0.001, d = 0.70], resulting in slight (non-significant)
overestimation. These findings suggest that the actual duration
of a previous task can influence whether the underestimation
indicative of the planning fallacy (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
occurs on a focal task.
Although providing feedback on the actual duration of a
previous task did not debias predictions on a focal task per se,
there was some support for the memory-bias account (e.g., Roy
et al., 2008) as predictions on the second task were more strongly
correlated with actual durations on the first task in the essay-
first conditions in Experiments 1 and 3. Coupled with the task
similarity effect, this finding suggests that remembered previous
task duration influences predictions on subsequent tasks but only
serves to reduce bias when the tasks are the same.
Support for the memory-bias account was not universal,
however, as predictions on the second task and actual durations
on the first task were only weakly correlated in all conditions
in Experiment 2. As the duration of the first task was recalled
quite accurately in the castle-first and essay-first memory-prompt
conditions in Experiment 2, the lack of a strong correlation in
the essay-first conditions is not easily explicable, especially as
recalled and actual durations on the first task were similar in both
memory-prompt conditions. Given the manipulation of previous
task duration feedback in Experiment 3 that experiment seems
to provide a better barometer for the memory-bias account. The
stronger correlation between previous task durations and focal
task predictions in the essay-first feedback condition than the
castle-first feedback condition in Experiment 3 indicates that
task duration feedback does not serve to correct memory and
debias predictions when previous and focal tasks are different.
Thus, it seems that the memory-bias account should be revised
to incorporate task similarity, especially with respect to the role
of duration feedback.
Consistent with the memory-bias, self-learning, and
anchoring accounts, this research suggests that information
about previous tasks is considered when predicting task duration,
but does necessarily reduce bias as the inside–outside account
implies (e.g., Buehler et al., 1994). Moreover, in accordance with
Roy et al.’s (2008) research, Experiment 2 indicates that the
feedback duration of a previous task is recalled quite accurately
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1 week after being provided. It could be that the quite lengthy
interval between the first and second tasks in the present research
was not sufficient to eliminate the memory-trace of the feedback
duration of the first task because this information was provided
just after the first task was performed. Thus, the immediacy of
the feedback provided in Experiment 2 might have consolidated
participants’ memory for the duration of the first task and
facilitated learning for participants that performed the essay task
twice, resulting in less prediction bias on the second essay task.
This research highlights the effect of similarity on task
duration prediction bias. It has been shown that predictions are
less biased when the same task is performed 1 week previously.
In addition, by providing accurate feedback on the duration
of a just-completed identical or different task (Experiments 1
and 2) and manipulating the provision of such information
(Experiment 3), the research demonstrates that having such
knowledge is an effective method for reducing misestimation
only when a previous task is the same as a focal task. The
research provides consistent support for the self-learning account
and as well as some support for the anchoring and memory-
bias accounts, and suggests that information about previous task
performance is used when predicting task duration. However,
contrary to the inside–outside account, the research suggests that
using such information does not necessarily reduce prediction
bias. Importantly, the research calls into question the claim
that ignoring information about previous tasks can explain the
planning fallacy and task duration prediction bias (e.g., Buehler
et al., 1994).
The present research indicates that the similarity of previous
and focal tasks is an important factor in the process of predicting
task duration effectively. The basis of the effect of task similarity
was mainly due to differences between the essay-first and castle-
first conditions in actual durations on the second task, with
predictions on the essay only differing between these conditions
in Experiment 1. In all experiments, the essay task in the second
session was performed in less time when the same task was
performed in the first session compared with when the very
different castle task was performed in the first session. Coupled
with the task similarity effect, this finding suggests that the
similarity of a previous task can influence actual behaviors, with
performance on a focal task being facilitated when that same task
has been completed 1 week before. The positive effect of task
similarity on actual behavior provides further support for the self-
learning account (König et al., 2015) by indicating that the insight
gained from knowing about one’s mistakes on a previous similar
task can be transferred to not only predicting the duration of the
next task better but also performing that task quicker.
The reasons that participants in Experiment 3 gave for their
prediction on the second task are supportive of the finding that
previous task similarity can influence actual behaviors on the
next task as the first task was referred to by most participants in
the essay-first and castle-first conditions. This finding suggests
that the task that people have done most recently in a given
environment is what they base their prediction on regarding how
long they believe the next task in that same environment will
take to perform. Basing predictions on how well one performed
on a previous task should not reduce bias on the next task
when that task is very different because the characteristics of the
tasks are heterogeneous (Thomas et al., 2007). As retrospective
verbal reports might not the most robust form of data (Ericsson
and Simon, 1980), future research should create experimental
manipulations to unpack the effect of task similarity on actual
behaviors as well as predictions of task duration. Doing so
would elucidate the cognitive mechanisms underpinning time
prediction as well as the transfer of insight between one’s
performance on previous and focal tasks, thus further testing the
self-learning account (König et al., 2015).
Although the present research makes an important
contribution to the literature by enhancing our understanding
the time prediction process, it also gives rise to some ideas for
developing the field further. One avenue that could potentially
bolster support for the self-learning account is to examine
whether the transfer of insight from previous to focal tasks
results in reduced prediction bias when the focal task is an
unfamiliar one with which participants have limited or no prior
experience. The present focus on the effect of task similarity
with a familiar type of focal task precluded the use of a fully
crossed factorial experimental design, which did not compromise
the interpretation of the findings but meant that the role of
task similarity was not explored as fully as it could have been.
By manipulating the familiarity of focal and previous tasks
along with prior task experience, future research will be able to
delineate the time prediction process more fully, thus permitting
a further test of the self-learning account as well as the other
theoretical accounts.
Another seemingly fruitful direction for future research to
further test all four accounts would be to examine the role of
individual differences in feeling states and task engagement as
it has been shown that these factors can differentially influence
performance on tasks requiring different mental operations
(Matthews et al., 2002; see also Langner et al., 2010). For
example, using scores on the short version of the Dundee
Stress State Questionnaire (DSSQ; Matthews et al., 2002), which
assesses subjective experience in task performance situations,
Matthews et al. (2002) found higher distress, lower worry
and some increase in task engagement was evident for tasks
involving working memory (e.g., mental arithmetic), whereas
for tasks involving vigilance (e.g., watching images), which are
less mentally demanding, lower worry, lower task engagement,
and some distress was evident. Such research has potentially
important implications for the field of task duration prediction
as support for the planning fallacy (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) and temporal misestimation in general has been observed
on a diverse range of tasks (see Buehler et al., 2010a, for a
review), which are highly unlikely to be uniform in terms of
the mental demands they place on the people performing them.
Thus, examining the interplay between task type and individual
differences in task engagement and stress state would provide
a welcome addition to the task duration prediction literature.
In the context of the present research, it could be that the
essay-formatting task requires the kind of mental demands that
apply to tasks involving vigilance (e.g., searching for grammatical
errors) and so could be characterized by lower task engagement.
Through using established psychometric measures like the
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 May 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 760
fpsyg-09-00760 May 22, 2018 Time: 17:35 # 13
Thomas and König Task Duration Prediction Bias
DSSQ and systematically varying the type of tasks that people
perform, future research will be able to provide an even more
thorough account of the task duration prediction process and its
determinants.
A final noteworthy avenue for future research concerns
evaluating the way in which prediction bias is measured
to ascertain whether proportional error scores are the most
appropriate measure of bias when it comes to repeated exposure
to the same task or similar tasks. Specifically, to determine
whether there are test–retest effects at play that reduces the
reliability of error scores as a suitable dependent measure. For
example, being exposed to the present essay-formatting task
for the second time in 7 days might mean that participant in
the essay-first conditions automatically incorporated what they
had learnt from performing the task the first time around into
their prediction on the second trial of the task, thus influencing
the error score derived from their performance on the second
task.
Test–retest effects in relation to the speed and accuracy of
task performance were examined by Steinborn et al. (2018) who
took a psychometric approach and used a letter-checking task
designed to assess sustained attention. The research revealed that
the speed of repeated performance on the task was more reliable
a measure of task performance accuracy relative scores based on
errors, suggesting that such scores are not suitable as a principal
measure of task performance accuracy. Although proportional
error scores have been used widely in the task duration prediction
literature (e.g., Roy et al., 2008; Thomas and Handley, 2008), and
are an established measure of temporal misestimation (Brown,
1997), which takes account of differences in the speed of task
performance (i.e., actual durations), their susceptibility to the
effects of repeated task exposure has not been examined. Whilst
assessing the robustness of error scores is beyond the scope of the
present research, the worth of doing so in future research should
be recognized if we are to gain a sufficiently thorough picture of
the task duration prediction process.
By examining two key factors that influence the task duration
prediction process in tandem, this research has arguably raised
more questions than it has answered. For example, does the effect
of task similarity occur when the interval between previous and
focal tasks is longer or shorter than 1 week? Does using the
duration of a previous similar or different task as an anchor for
predictions influence bias only when there is scope to adjust
predictions from anchor values according to the demands of
focal tasks? Can variations in predictions on focal tasks as well
as in actual durations of previous tasks explain the effect of task
similarity when previous task duration feedback is not available?
By answering such questions, future research will be even better-
placed to identify the gamut of factors that are germane to the
process of predicting task duration.
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